José Luis Méndez Méndez
Special for Resumen Latinoamericano
In 1989, U.S. territory became a safe haven for the assassin Orlando Bosch; furthermore, he could be kept under control and his movements monitored, given his long years of service to the CIA. Blackmail and threats against Venezuelan authorities—along with labeling President Carlos Andrés Pérez a traitor for having re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba—were factors considered in the decision to admit him.
New revelations shed light on this murky criminal plot from 50 years ago. After the downing of the Cuban plane, Luis Posada Carriles suggested getting the terrorist Orlando Bosch out of Venezuela, and on October 9, Bosch crossed into Colombian territory.
It also emerged that in August 1976, Orlando García Vázquez—according to Bosch’s own statements—sent messages to Nicaragua (where the terrorist was dividing his time between South America and the Caribbean) inviting him to travel to Venezuela.
He was given assurances that García Vázquez was bearing a presidential message and would personally receive him to discuss matters of mutual interest; as will be seen later, García Vázquez’s aim was to smooth over the friction and disagreements of previous years. It was well known that the criminal railed openly against the Venezuelan leader, branding him—both publicly and privately—a traitor for having restored full relations with Cuba.
The fanatic Bosch Ávila argued that the governments of San José, Panama, and Bogotá “had devised a sinister plan—a pact—to bring Castro back into the OAS.” His wariness and distrust of the Venezuelan authorities were well-founded; in 1974, the terrorist had struck a deal for immunity with other Cubans—such as Rafael Rivas Vázquez and Orlando García, members of Venezuela’s DISIP—but they had failed to honor their side of the bargain, which stipulated that “no official of the Cuban regime would be permitted to enter Venezuela.”
The aforementioned García Vázquez—who later died in Miami—was a close associate of Carlos Andrés Pérez; they had met in Costa Rica, where both were living in political exile during the 1950s. He had sought asylum at the Costa Rican embassy in Havana on May 18, 1956. A CIA agent responsible for Carlos Andrés Pérez’s personal security and intelligence, he was a true power behind the throne in Venezuela. He was a fiercely loyal friend. While in Cuba, he had been a member of the *Unión Insurreccional Revolucionaria* (UIR) alongside Bosch, José de Jesús Jinjaume, and others.
Bosch’s discontent had a backstory; thus, after hesitating over Orlando García’s offer, he consulted his second-in-command, Frank Castro, before deciding to travel to Caracas, where he arrived in September. They agreed that if he were betrayed once more, Castro would direct acts of terror against Venezuelan targets.
Upon his arrival, he was accorded the treatment of a distinguished guest. During talks with alleged emissaries of President Pérez—who were, at the time, executives within DISIP—he dealt with individuals holding high-ranking leadership positions: Cuban exiles and CIA agents. These agents had arrived in 1967 under the agency’s direction to organize the repression of Venezuelan revolutionary movements and figures, as part of a counterinsurgency program launched earlier that decade during the U.S. Democratic administration of Kennedy and Johnson.
According to Bosch, Posada Carriles, García Vázquez, and Morales Navarrete—three key DISIP executives—urged him to step up actions against Guyana. The terrorists’ motive for attacking that country’s interests and nationals was Guyana’s decision to allow Cuban planes bound for Angola to refuel at its airports before continuing their journey to Africa. On September 7, 1976, a bomb was planted at the Guyanese embassy in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago.
In the eyes of the terrorists, this was a punitive measure because Guyana, under the government of Prime Minister Linden Forbes Burnham, had become a pro-Soviet Marxist state. This was the mistaken view held by North American political scientists when assessing that government’s behavior during the latter half of the 1970s. Burnham allowed Cuba to use Guyana’s international airport for refueling during the initial Cuban foray into Angola in 1975. This—also erroneous—perspective held by political scientists tended to downplay the Cubans’ internationalist mission, which would succeed in defeating the imperialist invasion of the newly independent African nation. Guyana was a country targeted by anti-Cuban factions.
According to Bosch, he was asked not to pursue actions in or against the interests of Costa Rica or Panama; in exchange, he would be permitted to settle in Venezuela, engage in political proselytizing, and raise funds, while enjoying protection from the DISIP and receiving assistance to facilitate his operations and movements. The terrorist refused to exclude Panama from the alleged proposal made by the Venezuelan president—who, according to Bosch’s host Orlando García, was set to receive him at La Casona (the presidential residence) on October 10, 1976.
On August 18, the aforementioned CORU (Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations) had claimed responsibility for planting bombs that exploded at the Cubana de Aviación offices in the Panamanian capital and at Tocumen International Airport.
On December 30, 1973, terrorists from the Cuban National Liberation Front (FLNC) planted a bomb on a Panamanian ship in Miami. Bosch sought to continue targeting Panamanian interests because of that country’s solidarity with the Island—specifically regarding efforts to lift the political and diplomatic isolation that was then being challenged by various nations within the OAS.
The first recorded action by the newly formed criminal spawn known as CORU took place on July 1 of that year: the detonation of a bomb at the Costa Rica-Cuba Cultural Center in San José—an act many attribute to Luis Posada Carriles. This occurred around the time the operational alliance that gave rise to CORU was established.
The conditions were set, the resources provided, and the political decision made; all that remained was for the terrorists to act. Against this backdrop, the fanatic Orlando Bosch hatched his long-cherished scheme to bring down Cuban aircraft—as well as those from other nations—in order, as he saw it, to draw attention to his fight against communism. By June 22, the initial plan was ready, and the sentence was set to be carried out.
October 4, 2026
